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ABSTRACT
This paperstudiesimplicitly colluding oligopolists facing fluctuating
demand. The credible threat of future punishments provides the discipline that
facilitatescollusion. However, we find that the temptation to unilaterally
deflatefrom the collusive outcome is often greater when demand is high. To
moderate this temptation,the optimizing oligopoly reduces its profitability at
such times,resulting inlowerprices. If the oligopolists' output is an input
toother sectors, their output may increase too. This explains the co—movements
of outputs which characterize business cycles. The behavior of the railroads in
the 1880's, the automobile industry in the 1950's and the cyclical behavior of
cementprices andprice—cost margins support our theory. (J.E.L. Classification
nuzjzbers:020, 130, 610).
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Thispaper has two objectives.Firstit isan exploration of the
way in whicholigopolies behave over the business cycle. Second, it
considersthe possibility that this behaviour itself is a cause of
business cycles and of sticky prices. Weexamine implicitly colluding
cligopolies that attempt to sustain above competitive profits by the
threat of reverting to competitive behavior to punish firms that do not
cooperate. The basic point of the paper is that the oligopolists find
implicit collusion of this kind more difficult when their demand is high.
In other words when an industry faces a boom in its demand, chiseling
away from the collusive level of output becomes more profitable for each
individual firm and thus the oligopoly can only sustain a less collusive
outcome. This suggests that when demand for goods produced by
oligopolists is high, the economy produces an allocation which is
'closer" to the competitive allocation and thusnearer the production
possibilityfrontier. Insofar as the allocation in which the oligopoly
actscollusively is inside the production possibility frontier, a shift
indemand towards the oligopolistic sector can increase the output of all
goods. The fact that the outputs of all goods tend to move together is,
ofcourse, the hallmark of business cycles. Thus we can interpret booms
in aggregate economic activity as being due to a shift in demand towards
the oligopolistic sectors andbustsas shifts towards the competitive
sectors.
This analysis still leaves unexplained the causes of the shifts in
sectoral demands. To make sense of actual business cycles one would have
to relate these shifts in demand to changes in the money supply and
interest rates which are highly correlated with cyclical fluctuations.2
tile the connection between financial variables and shiftsin demandis
beyondthescope of this paper it must be noted that these shifts form
partof the popular discussions of the early stages of recoveries. At
that point consumers desire for cars and other durables usually picks
up.
Theoligopoliesweconsiderknow thatdeviations from someagreed
upon strategy lead to punishments. Unfortunately there are usually a
multitudeof equilibria in such settings. These equilibria differ in the
mechanics by which reversion to punishing behavior takes place, by the
length and intensity of the punishment interval as well as by the amount
of collusion that takes place when the firms are not punishing each
other. One standard technique for choosing among these equilibria (see,
for example, Porter (1983a)) is to concentrate on the equilibrium that is
optimal from the point of view of the oligopolists.
Unfortunately it is often very difficult to characterize these
optima. Even Porte?s paper considers only linear demand and optimizes
only over a subset of all the possible strategies. In particular, he
considersonly punishments in which firmsactas if they were involved in
a sequence of one—shot noncooperative games. Thus the most firms cando
to each other when they are punishing and being punished is to compete as
if theywereplaying a sequence of static games. This considerably
simplifies the analysis. Ourotherwise optimal supergames also embody
this assumption which is not essential in all cases.
In our model the reversion to competitive behaviour occurs for a
periodof infinite length. This length is optimal since it is the
biggestcredible threat and since, along the equilibrium path, firma
neverfind themselves punishing each other. Instead for each state of3
demand we focus on the outcome closest to monopoly that the oligopoly can
sustain given the threat. Any outcome closer to monopoly would lead to a
breakdown in discipline. Any outcome further from monopoly would simply
result in lower oligopoly profits. We show that when demand rises, the
best sustainable outcome generally becomes more competitive. Our
strongest results are for the case in which prices are the strategic
variable and there are constant marginal costs. Then an increase in
demand actually towers the oligopoly's prices monotonically after a
certain point. This occurs because keeping the oligopoly's price
constant when demand increases raises the payoff to a single firm from
towering its price slightly and thus capturing alt of demand. To deter
each firm from doing this the oligopoly must actually lower its price.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II presents the optimal
supergamefor both the cases in which the oligopoly treats prices and the
case in which it treats outputs as the strategic variable. Ye also
discusssimpler games inwhich, as in Breshnahan (1981), Green andPorter
(1964) and Porter (1983b) the oligopoly canonlybehave either
monopolistically or competitively. It is then in general more likely to
behave competitively when demand is high. Section III establishes the
connection with macroeconomics. It describes a simple twosectorgeneral
equilibriummodel in which oRe sector isoligopolistic and the other
sector is competitive. The oligopolistic sector's output is purchased
both by consumers and by the competitive sector. When demand shifts
towards the oligopolistic sector, this sector lowers its prices. This,
in turn, leads the competitive sector to increase its purchases from the
oligopolistic sector andthus increaseits output as well. So both4
sectors grow, only to shrink when demand moves back towards the
competitive sector or when the punishment period is over.
Any theory whose foundation is that competitive behaviour is more
likely to occur in booms must confront the tact that the industrial
organization folklore is that price wars occur in recessions. This
folklore is articulated in Sherer (1980) for example. Our basis for
rejecting this folklore is not theoretical. We concede that tt is
possible to construct models in which recessions induce price wars.
Insteadour rejection isbased on facts. First, at a very general level,
itcertainly appears that business cycles are related to sluggish
adjustment of prices (see Rotemberg (1982) for example). Prices rise too
little in booms andfalltoo littleinrecessions. If recessions tended
to produce massive price wars this would be an unlikely finding. !€ore
specifically we analyze some other sources of data capable of shedding
light on the folklore. Thatwefind is thatbothScherer's evidence and
ourownstudyof the cyclical properties of price cost margins supports
our theory. Our theory is also supported by an analysis, of the price
wars purported to have happened in the automobile industry (Bresnahan
(1981)) and the railroad industry (Porter (1983a)). These wars have
occurredin periods of high demand. Finally, since Sherer singles out
the cenent industry as having repeated break—ups of its cartel during
recessions,we study the cyclical properties of cement prices. To our
surprise, cement prices are strongly countercyclical even though cement,
as construction as a whole, hasaprocyclical level of output. These
empirical regularities are discussed in Section IV. We conclude with
Section V.5
II.aQUILIBRIUM IN OLIGOPOLISTIC SUPERGAMES WITH DEMAND FLUCTUATIONS
Weconsideran oligopoly of N symmetric firms in en infinite—horizon setting
for boththe case where the firms use price as the strategic variable and that in
whichthe strategic variable is output. It is well—known thatinsuch models
evenfirws thatcannot sign binding contracts, i.e. noncooperating firmsinthe
usual sense, are usually able to sustain outcomes in anyperiod that strictly
dominatethe outcorte in the corresponding one—period game.
In order to achieve this the equilibrium strategies must involve a mechanism
that detersan individual firm from "cheating" (by expanding output or by shading
prices). One such mechanism and one that has been fruitfuilly employed in
theoretical models2, is the use of punishments against the defecting firmin
periodsfollowing the defection. If such punishments are large enough to
outweigh the gain from a single period defection the collusive outcome is
sustainable.
In order for the equilibrium strategies to be sequentially rational3,
however, it must be the case that if a defection actually occurs the non—
defecting firms are willing to mete out the proposed punishment. One way to
ensure this is for firms that defect from the punishment to be punished in turn,
andso on. Rules which lead to optimal outcomes for the firms are provided by
Abreu(1982). A simpler way to ensure sequential rationality andtheone usually
employed (see Green and Porter (1984),forexample) is for punishments to Cnvolve
playing the equilibrium strategies from the one—period game for some fixed period
of time. In the sequel we restrict attention to strategies of this kind. As ye
will see shortly, in addition to their simplicity and conformity with the
literature they are also optimal punishments when price is the strategic
variable.6
The major departure of our model from those that have previouslybeen
studied is that we allow for observable shifts in industrydemand,We denote the
inverse demandfunction by whereis the industry output in periodt
andcis the random variable denoting the observable demandshock(with
realization in period t). Ye assume that increases in Stresultin higher
prices for any t' that £hasdomain [,] anda distribution function F( c) and
that these are the same across periods (i.e. shocks are i.i.d.). Ye denote firm
i's output in period t by so that
—ii 1'
Thetiming of events is as follows: At thebeginning of the period all
firmslean the realization of(more precisely sbecomescommon knowledge).
Firms then simultaneously choose the level of their choice variable (price or
uantity). These choices then determine the outcome for that period in a way
that depends on the choice variable: in the case of quantities the price clears
the market given in the case of prices the firm with the lowest price sells
as much as it wants at its quoted price, the firm with the second lowest price
then supplies as much of the remaining demand at its quoted price as it wants,
and soon. The strategic choices of all the firms then become common knowledge
and this one—period gameis repeated.
Theforce of the obsenability of Standthe key to the difference between
the model and its predecessors is the following: The punishments that firms face
depend on the future realizations of c. The expected value of such punishments
therefore depends on the expected value of c. However the reward for cheating in
anyperioddepends on the observable s. We show thatfor a wide variety of
interesting cases the reward for cheating from the joint profit—maximizing level7
isnonotonicallyincreasing in Ifislarge enough, the temptation to
cheatoutweighs the punisbaent." Being cognizant of this fact, an
implicitlycolluding oligopoly settles on a profit below the fully collusive
level in periods of high demand so as to adequately reduce the temptation to
cheat. Such moderation of its behavior tends to lower prices below what they
would otherwise be, and may indeed cause them to be lower than for states with
lower demand. Ye illustrate this phenomenon for both prices as well as for
quantities as strategic variables.
(a) Price as the strategic variable
We begin with an analysis of the case inwhich marginalcostsare equal to a
constant c. We demonstrate that the baste characteristics of our analysisare
notdependent on this assumption by meansofan example below.
Let us point out at the outset that there always exists an equilibrium in
which all the firms set P=c in all periods. In this competitive case firma
expectfutureprofitsto be zero whether they cooperate at time t or not.
Accordingly the game at time t is essentially a one—shot game in which the unique
equilibrium has all firms setting Pc. In what follows we concentrate instead on
the equilibria that are optimal for the firms in the industry.
We begin by examining joint profit—maximization and the benefits to
unilateral defections from it. Define rf(Q(e),e)tobe the profit of an
individual firm in stateif the firms each produce qa which equals 1/N of the
jointprofit—maximizing output, qm If a firmdeviates from this proposed
outcomeit can earnapproximatelyNI? by cutting price by an arbitrarily small
amountand supplying the entire market demand. Firm i would therefore deviate
from joint profit—maximizing output if
NrIm(Qt(et),ct) — > i.e.if d(Q(e),e)>K(ct)/(N_1)8
where K1(t) is the punishment inflicted on firm i in the future if it deviates
at time t.
The value of K±(s) depends on both the expected level offutureprofits if
there is no deflation at time t and on the nature of the punishment. Since we
want to concern ourselves with equilibrium strategies that are optimal for the
oligopoly and hence are interested in maintaining profits that are as large as
possible, we concentrate on punishments that are as large as possible; namely
those that have Pc for all t following a defection. While infinite punishment
periods are extreme they are subgaxne perfect and need not actually be implemented
in equilibrium. If the industry members change over time, however, infinite
length punishments are not compelling. To moderate the effect of this assumption
in the calculation of specific examples, we use reduced levels of the discount
rate, 8.
Suppose that the level of firm profits that can be sustained in a period
with stateis K(ct)) when the punishment is K(e). Then using infinite
length punishments, the discounted future value of profits, and hence the
punishment, is
f flS(S K(c'fldF(&). (I)
Sincethe right hand side of (i)is independent of Ct. the punishment is




4)_c)Q — c). Therefore, for given K, there is some highest level
of demand shock, c(K), which (N_1)?(Q(et),c). K.
This meansthat for!Ct,the monopoly outcome is sustainable so that
K) —flm(Q(), Bycontrast, for e .?. an individual9
firm hasan incentive to cheat unless
K)
—— t(Q(e),e). (2)
Ofcourse IC in turn depends onfrom Euatton (1). In particular we have
•-g [f &Qt(ct).s)dF(t) +(i+r("Dif(q"(€'),t)I.s (3)
Thus we have a mapping from the space of possible punishmentsinto itself: a
givenpunisbment impliei a cutoff e whichin turnimplies a new punishment from
(2).Anequilibrium is a tired point of this mapping.
Itremainstoprovide sufficientconditionsforthe existenceofsuch a







where a is o/(i—o).
We need to show there exists an 4(e, D suchthat g(4) —0.








Therefore,using (4) and (5) liii e(4)(n—i) ?(Q().) —___________
C t.!
which is negative if N < (i÷o)/((i—o) (Condition (i)).
At the other extreme,
g(t) —(N—1)tf'(Q(t),) —af:!r1(Q(C),C)dF(C) >010
if nm(Q(),-/f: I?(Q,£t)dP(tt)> WO'—i) (condition Cii)).
IfConditions ft) and (ii) hold, we have:
(a) g(4) is continuous, (b) g() > 0, and Cc) urn g(e') C 0, which imply the
existence of an 4€Ce,) such that g(4) 0 as required.
ConditionsCi)and (ii)have intuitively appealing interpretations.
Condition Ci) ensures that the firms are not tempted to "cheat" from the joint
profit—maximizing output in all states. Thisrequires that N not be "too" large
relativeto the discount rate. the larger is the discount rate (so that the
future is more important and hence the effect of the punishment is greater) the
larger the nwnber of firma the industry is able to support without a complete
breakdown in discipline.
Condition (ii)ensuresthat the monopoly outcome is not the only solution in
every state. This follows when there is sufficient dispersion in the
distribution or profit maximizing outputs. Clearly if there is no dispersion,
then for large enough punishments there is never any incentive to cheat. The LHS
of condition (ii) is ameasure of the dispersion of profits.
Althoughg(c') is continuous it is not necessarily monotone. As a result
there may be multiple values of e' for which g(e')0. Since we are concerned
with optimal schemes from the point of view of the firms in the industry, we
concentrate on the greatest such value.
There are several interesting features of this equilibrium. First note that
* 5 ElUt *•
fore) cwe have liCe,Ic)il((QCe),c ).Yhen r?(e,K)is so
tt tttt
con8trained, must be as high as possible without reducing firmprofitsbelow
the sustainable level. By the definition of the lf( .),ifis lowerIi
andP is higher an individual firm has an incentive to shade price slightly and
supply the industry demand. When Ct goes up, Q mustgoup if Ct)is to
remainconstant since P is increasing in Ct anddecreasingin Q.Moreover, if
isheld constant at a level above a, the profits from deviating increase.
Therefore P must fall. Beyond c, prices fall monotonical].y as increases.
Below the oligopoly charges the monopoly price thus P tends to increase with
Themodel behaves as intuition would suggestwith respect to changes in the
relevantparameters. Note firstly that the equilibrium value of IC is decreasing
inN. Therefore, given (2) ?(Q(e), is also decreasing in N. Thus the set
of states in which the monopoly outcome is sustainable is strictly decreasing in
N. In contrast to traditional models of oligopolistic interaction in which
oligopolies of all sires are always unabletoachieve perfect collusion, the
firmainthis model are usually able to do so for a range of states of demand.
However,asin Stigler's model (1964) the degree of implicit collusion varies
inverselywith N.
As & decreases so that the future becomes less important, the equilibrium
value of K decreases and hence the sustainable level of profits and the set of
states in which monopoly profits are sustainable also shrinks.
As was mentioned above, punishments are never observed in eauilibrium. Thus
the oligopoly doesn't fluctuate between periods of cooperation andnoncooperation
asin the models of Green and Porter (1984) and Porter (1983b). This arises
becauseof the complete observability of Ct.To provide an analagous model to
those just mentioned, we would have to further restrict the strategy space so
that the oligopoly can choose only between the joint monopoly price and the12
competitive price. Such a restriction is intuitively appealing since the
resulting strategies are much simpler and less delicate. With this restriction
onstrategies the firras knowthatwhendemand is high the monopoly outcome cannot
bemaintained. They therefore assume that the competitive outcome will emerge,
which issufficient to fulfill their prophecy. In manystates of the world the
oligopoly will earn lowerprofits thanunder the optimal scheme we have analyzed.
As a result, since punishments are lower, there will be fewer collusive states
*
thanbefore. Therewill still be some cutoff, e, thatdelineatesthe
cooperative and noncooperative regions. In contrast to the optimalmodel,
however, the graph of price as a function of state will exhibit a sharp decline
afterwith Pc thereafter.
The above models impose no restrictions on the demand function except that
it be downward sloping and that demand shocks move it outwards. However the
model does assume constant marginal costs. The case of increasing marginal cost
is more complex than that of constant marginal costs for three reasons: (i) A
firm that cheats by price—cutting does not always want to supply the industry
demand at the price it is charging. Specifically, it would never supply an
output at which its marginal cost exceeded the price. So whereas before cheating
paid offwhen (N_1)1f'(s, K) > K now it pays off when if(c, K) > ri'(s, KP) —IC
whereIt"(et, IC, )isthe profit to the firm that defects whenits opponents
charge P; (2) If a firm is to be deterred from cheating it must be the case that
ri5(e, K, I') —&'(c,,IC, P) —Ki.e., the sustainable profit varies by state (in
contrastto the marginalcost case). (3)Withincreasing marginal cost cheating
canoccur byraising aswell as bylowering prices. If its opponents are
unwilling to supply all of demand at their quoted price a defecting firm is able
to sell some output at higher prices.17
Afew results can nonetheless be demonstrated. First suppose thatdeviating
firms do not meet all of demand. Instead the output which equates the monopoly
price to their marginal cost is less than demand. this occurs when N is large
andwhenmarginalcostsrisesteeply.Then the deviating firmsequateP(Q,
ando(q)where c' is thederivative of total costs with respectto outputBy
theenvelope theorem the change in the deviants profit from an increase inis
d in in It
_____________ ctet.
d .Thechange in profits from going along ii d It
Ct ct
is thus smaller, ensuring that deviations become more tempting as Ct rises.
However, in this case, if the oligopoly keeps its price constant in response to
the increase inthe desire to deviate actually falls. This occurs because
when the price is constant the profits from deviating are constant. Instead,
since the oligopoly price exceeds marginal cost, an increase in s accompanied by
a constant price raises the profits from going along.
When deviating firma meet all of demand the analysis is zore difficult. For
this case we consider an example in which demand and marginal costs ate linear:
Pa+ et_bct (6)
— + dq/2 (7)




If deviating firms could sell all they wanted at a price a shade below
they would equate (c+dq) to P. This would lead to output equal to
it-[(a +- c)(b+d/N)]/[d(2b+a/N)] (10)¶4
The actual output of the deviating firm, is the minimumof qand qm• So the
deviating firm meets demand as long as b is bigger than or equalto(N—OdIN.
Marginal coat must not rise too rapidly and N must not be too big.
When the deviating fin meets demand its profitsare:
rn+ Nd(1—N)(q"52/2 (ii)
The change in I?' from a change in is simply qm• Therefore using (a)the




which is positive when demand is met, Cheating becomes more desirable as
rises. If the oligopoly is restricted to either collude or compete, high
will generate price wars. Alternatively the oligopoly can pick prices p5 which
just deter potentially deviating firms. These prices equate U5, the profits from
going along, with —Kwhere K is the expected present value of minus the
profits obtained when all firms set price equal to marginal cost.
Since q'1 is linear in p8 whether deflating firms meet demand or marginal
d a. ii. S cost,11 is quadratic in P in both cases. U is also quadratic in P .Fora
given IC one can then find in the states that do not support monopoly by
solvingtwo quadratic equations. Therelevant root is the one with the highest
valueof [j8 which is consistent with the deviating firmsplanning to meetdemand
ormarginal cost. The resulting P5'a then allow one to find a new value for K.
One can thus iterate numerically on K starting with a large number. Since larger
values of K induce more cooperation the first K which is a solution to the
iterativeprocedure is the best equilibrium the oligopoly can enforce with














































































































































theTA to the monopolypricesas a function of states for a specific configuration
of parameters. In particular c is uniforlrLly destributed over (o,i,... ,ao}.
Asbefore the price rises monotoni.oally to St and then falls. The majOr
difference here is that eventually the price begins to rise again. The
explanation for this is straightforward. For high values ofthe equilibrium
value of P is such that a deviating firm would increase its output only until P
equals its marginal cost; it is not willing to supply all that is demanded at its
lower price. An improvement in demand from this level accompanied by a constant
price actually reduces the incentive to cheat. Thus the oligopoly can afford to
increase its prices somewhat.
b)Quantities asstrategicvariables.
There are two differences between the case in which quantities are used as
strategic variables and the case in which prices are. First, when an individual
firmconsidersdeviations from the behavior favoredby theoligopoly, itassumes
thatthe other firms will keep their quantities constant. The residual demand
curve is therefore obtained by shifting the original demand curve to the left by
the amount of their combined output. Second, when firms are punishing each other
the outcome in punishment periodsis the Cournot equilibrium.
Theresultsweobtainwith quantities as strategic variables are somewhat
weaker thanthosewe obtained with prices. In particular itisnow not true that
any increase in demand even with constant marginal costs leads to a bigger
incentive to deflate from the collusive level of output. However, we present
robust examples in which this is the case. We also show with an example that
increases in demand can, as before, lead monotonically to "more competitive"
behavior.
-16
Weshow that increases in demand do not- necessarily increase the incentive
to deviate by means of a counterexample. Suppose that deaand is characterized by
constant elasticity andthata demand shock moves it horizontally from state 4
tostate 4.Inthis setup the collusive price is the same in both states.
Therefore any firm that produces the collusive output sells more in statethan
in state 4.Theresidual demand curves the firm faces are therefore as
represented in Figure 2. A deviating firm chooses output to maximize profits
given these residual demand curves. Suppose that this maximum is achieved at
output D andpricedforstate c. For this to be a worthwhile deviation it
mustbe the case that the revenues from the extra sales due to cheating (CD) are
greaterthantheloss in revenues on the old sales from the decrease in price
a d fromP(Q ,.)toP •But(exceptfor a horizontal translation) the firm faces the
sameresidual demand curve in both states. Thus byselling at d, the extra
sales due to cheating are the same at 4(As)than ats (CD). Moreover the loss
inrevenue on old sales is strictly smaller at 4.Thereforethe firm has a
strictly greater incentive to deviate in state 4thanin state 4.
Theabove counterexanple exploits the assumption of the constant elasticity
of demand only to establish that the collusive price is the samein both states.
Wehave therefore also proved a relatedproposition: if the oligopoly keeps its
price constant when increases (thus supplying all the increased demand), the
incentive to cheat isreducedwhen demand shifts horizontally. Thus in the
examples we provide below, the oligopoly is able to increase the price as the
state improves.
Suppose that, instead, demand and costs are linear as in (6) and (7). Then
an increase in calwaysleads to a bigger incentive to deviate from the
collusive output. This can be seen as follows. Suppoee that in this case theP(Qm..)
FIGURE 2
The Incentive to Deviate with
Quantities as the Strategic Variable
0 A B C D Q
P
(Qm,s)17
oligopoly agrees that each firm should produce q. The deviating firm therefore
maximizes:
rid—q[a + — c—
b((N—1)q
+q)J — dq/2 (t)




The derivative ofat the optimum with respect tois
Therefore, using (a),thederivative of the benefit from deviating from the
collusiveoutput in any one period is:
d(t1" —If') —[b(N_l)]2(a+c_c)
det (d+2bu)2(2b+ d)
which is always poBitive. Deviating becomes more tempting as increases,
independently of b andd,as tong as both are finite. Therefore in the repeated
setting as long as the discount rate is not too large or N too small, individual
firmswill deviate from the collusive outcome when demand is high. This leads to
price wars when the only options for the oligopoly are to either compete or
collude.
Alternatively the oligopoly can choose a level of output q5 that will just
deter fins from deviating when demand is high. These levels of output can be
obtained numerically in a manner analogous to the one used to obtain the in
the previous subsection. These outputs equate fl0, the profits from going along,
to crid—K)where K is the expected discounted difference between us and the
profits from the Cournot equilibrium. By substituting (16) in (13) 11d becomes
quadratic in q5. Sinceis also quadratic in q8 the q°'s are obtained as
solutions to quadratic equations for given IC.7 The resultingq8'sallow us to
compute a new value of K. By iterating in a manner analagous to the one used toIa
deriveFigure 1 we obtain the best equilibrium for the oligopoly. Figure 3plots
the ratio of this ui1ibrium price to the monopoly price as a function of
While a variant of the argument made earlier guarantees that equilibrium price
rises as c rises, it can be seen that beyond a certain Ct the ratio of

























So far we have considered only the behavior of an oligopoly in
isolation.For this behavior to form the foundation of business cycles
we need to model the rest of the economy, While the principle which
underlies these business cycles is probably quite general we illustrate
it with a simple example. Ye consider a "real" two sector general
equilibrium model in which the first sector is competitive while the
other is oligopolistic. There is also a competitive labormarket. To
keepthe model simple it is assused that workers have a horizontal supply
of labor at a wage equal tothe price of the competitive good. Since
the model is homogeneous of degree zero in prices, the wage itselfcan be
normalizedto equal one. So the price of the good producedcompetitively
must also equal one. This good can be produced with various combinations
of labor andgood 2. In particular the industry—wide production function








where is the output of the competitive sector at t, is the
amount of good two employed in the production of good 1 at t andLit
is
theamount of labor used in the production of good 1. Since the sector





Onthe other hand thedemand for good 2 by consumers is given by:
2t —n—2ct
+20
where20t is the quantity of good 2 purchased by consumers, n and in are
parameters and e is an i.i.d. random variable. Therefore total demand
for good 2 is given by:
2t —a+ — bQ2t
a —(lip+ my)/(m •p) a +p) (6)
b -mp/(m+ p)
Note that equation (16) is identical to equation (6). To continue
the parallelwith our sections on partial equilibrium we assumethat the
laborrequirementto produce 2t is:
L—cQ +
2t 2t'/2t
which implies that, asbefore,marginal cost isc+
dQ2t.The model
would be unaffected ifgood1 were also aninput intogood 2 sinceis
alwaysequalto the wage.Ifsector 2 behaved competitively marginal






Anincreaseinraises both the competitive price and the
competitive quantity of good 2. By (15) less of good 2 will be used in
theproduction of good I thusleading to a fall inthe output of good 1.
a shift in tastes raises the output of one good and lowers that of
the other. The economy implicitly has, given people's desire for
leisure, a production possibility frontier.
Similarly, if sector 2 always behaves like a monopolist, output and
price are given equations (s)and(9) respectively. Therefore increases
in raise both 2t and 2t thus lowering Q• Once again shifts in21
demand are unable to change the levels of both outputs in the same
direction. On the other hand if the industry behaves like the oligopoly
considered in the previous sections, an increase in etoan easily lead to
a fall in the relative price of good 2. This occurs in three out of the
four scenarios considered in previous sections. It occurs when the
unsustainability of monopoly leads to competitive outcomes whether the
strategic variable is price or output as long as increases in make
monopolyharder to sustain. It also always occurs when the strategic
variable is prices and the oligopoly plays an optimal supergame. The
decreaseinin turn leads firms inthe first sector to demand woreof
good2 as an input and to increase their output. So, a shift in demand
towardsthe oligopolistic goods raises all outputs much as all outputs
move together duringbusinesscycles.
A number of comments deserve to be madeaboutthis model of business
cycles.First our assumption that the real wage in terms of good I is
constant does not play an important role. In equilibriumthereduction
in raises real wages thus inducing workers to work more even if they
have an upwardly sloping supply schedule for labor. Thether this
increased supply of labor would be sufficient to meet the increased
demand for employees by sector 2 is unclear. If it wasn't the wage would
have to rise in terms of good 1. Nore interestingly if the increased
supply of labor was large, would have to rise thus increasing
employment also in sector I •Thiswould lead to an expansion even if
good 2 was not an input into good 1. This pattern of price movements is
consistent with the evidence on the correlation between product wages and
employmentpresented below.22
Second,the model can easilybemade consistent with the procyclica].
variation of profits. Even though sector 2 reduces the margin between
price and marginal cost as output expands, the difference between
ravennes and total costs can increase as long as there are fixed coats.
Third, it is luite plausible that changes in financial variables
like the money stock and interest rates lead shifts in the composition of
demand. For instance increases in the money stock might be associated
with lower interest rates and a higher demandfordurable goods. As
shownbelow, durable good industries appear to be more oligopolistic than
other industries. These shifts in demand form a large part of the
informal discussion surrounding the ¶983 recovery in the US ,for
example.
Randomshifts in demand havealready been showed to cause movements
inemployment in the asymetric information model of Grossman, Hart and
Maskin(ige3).However,contrary to the claims of Lilien (1982) such
random sectoral shifts do not appear to be correlated with agregate
fluctuations. Instead Abraham andKatz(1984) show that different
sectorsonly have distinct correlations with agregate output. Moreover
thesectors whose output is more correlated with agregate output appear
tohave a higher rate of growth on average. This leads to the
statistical illusion that when output grows faster, as in a recovery,
there is more intersectoral variance in output growth then when output
growth issmall,asin a recession. Note that AbrahamandKatz'sfinding
thatsome sectors are more"cyclic" than others accords well with our
theory thatshiftstowards oligopolistic sectors are necessary to expand
aggregateoutput.This finding also appears to be somewhat at odds with
theliterature on real business cycles (Long and Plosser (1983) and King23
and Plosser (1984)). In this literature expansions are caused by
favorableunobservable technological shocks. Aside from thefact that
thereis no independent evidence for the importance of these shocks and
that they do not appear in the casual discussions of the poop1. who are
directly affected bybusiness cycles it is somewhat peculiar that these
favorableshocks always recur in the same "cyclic" industries.8
Ourmodel also sheds light on some slightly unfashionable concepts
of Keynesian economics. One of the most pervasive facts about increases
in the money supply is that they are not accompanied by equiproportional
increases in prices. Prices appear to be sticky (of Rotemberg (1982)).
Suppose that, increases in St are correlated with increases in the money
supply. Then increases in output are correlated with increases in the
money supply. As long as increases in output raise the demand far real
moneybalances, increases in the money supply will be correlated with
increases in real money balances. Prices do not rise equipropor—
tionately. A second concept we can usefully discuss in the context of
ourmodel is that of a multiplier. This concept reflects the idea that
increases in demand lead output to rise which then leads to further
increases in demand. Here a shift in demand towards an oligopolistic
sector canraise that sector's output, lower its prices and thus raise
nationalincome. In turn this increased national income canleadtq
increases in the demand for other goods produced in oligopolistic markets
thus lowering their prices and raising their output as well. This




The theory presented in section II runs counter to the industrial
organization folklore.This folklore is best articulated in Scherer
(1980 p.208) who says: "Yet it is precisely when business conditions
really turn sour that price cutting runsmost rampant among oligopolists
with high fixed costs". Ourattemptat finding the facts thatsupport
this folklore has, however, been unsuccessful. Scherer cites three
industries whose experience is presented assupportingthe folklore.
These are rayon, cementand steel.For rayon he cites a study by Narkha
(1952)which shows mainly that the nominal price of rayon fell during the
GreatDepression. Since broad price indices fell during this period this
is hardly proof of a price war. Rayon has since been replaced by other
plastics making itdifficultto use postwar data to check whether any
real price cutting took place during postwar recessions. For steel
Scherer in fact admits the following: "...upto 1968 and except for some
episodes during the 1929—38depression,itwas 'sore successful than
either cement or rayon in avoiding widespread price deterioration, even
when operating at less than 65% capacity between 1958 and 1962 (p. 210).
This leaves cement. Ye study the cyclical properties of real ceient
prices below. To do this we collected data on the average price of
portland cement from the Minerals Yearbook published by the Bureau of
Mines. We then compare this price with the Producer Price Index and the
price index of construction materials published by the Bureau of Labor
statistics. Regressions of the yearly rate of growth of real cement
prices on the contemporaneous rate of growth of OTU' are reported in Table25
1.The coefficient of the rate of growth of GUI is always meaningfully
negative. A 1% increase in the rate of growth of ON? leads to a 0.5—1.0%
fall in the price of cement. To test whether the coefficients are
significantthe regression equations must be quasi—differenced since
their Durbin—Yatson statistics are small. Indeed the coefficients are
all significantly different from zero at the five percent level. More
casually,the real price of cementrose in the recession year 1954 while
itfell in the boom year 1955. similarly, it rose during the recession
year 1958 and fell in 1959.
These results show uniformly that the price of cement has a tendency
to move countercyclically as our theory predicts for an oligopoly. These
results are of course not conclusive. First, it might be argued that the
demandfor cement might be onlyweakly related to ON?. Without a
structuralmodel, which is well beyond the scope of this paper, this
auestion cannot be completely settled. The rate of growth of the output
of the cement industry has a correlation of .69 with the rate of growth
ofON? and of .77 with the rate of growth of constructionactivity
which iswell known to be procyclical. However, these correlations are
notsufficient to prove thatcement is "more procyclical" than the
ticalsector included in GNP. Second our regressions do not include
all the variables one would expect to see in a reduced form. Thus the
effect of GNP might be proxying for an excluded variable like the
capacityof cementmines which Scherer would probably expect to exercise
anegative effect on therealprice of cement. While this is indeed a
possibility it must be pointed out that capacity itself is an endogenous
variable which also responds to demand. It would thus be surprising if
enoughcapacity were built in a boom to more than offset the increase inTable I
THE CYCLICAL PROPERTIES OF CEMENTPRICES







































P is the price of cement, PH is the producer price index and Pis
the price index of construction materials. Standard errors are in
parenthesis.26
demand.If anything, the presence of costs of adjusting capacity would
make capacity relatively unresponsive to increases in GNP.
b) Actual price wars
There have been two recent studies showing that some industries
alternate beetween cooperative andnoncooperativebehavior.The first is
dueto Bresnahan(1981). Nestudiesthe automobile industry in 1954,
1955and 1956.Hetries toevaluate thedifferentinterpretations of the
eventsof 1955. That year production of automobiles climbed by 45% only
to fall 44% the following year. Bresuahan formally models the automobile
industry as carrying out two sequential games eachyear. The first
involvesthe choice of models and the second the choice of prices. He
concludes that the competitive model of pricing fits the 1955 data taken
by themselves while the collusive model fits the 1954 and 1956 data.
Those two years exhibited at be8t sluggish GNP growth. GNP fell. 1% in
1954 while it rose 2% in 1956. Instead 1955 was a genuine boom with GNP
growing 7%. Insofar as cartels can only sustain either competitive or
collusive outcomes, this is what our theory predicts. Indeed, in our
model, the competitive outcomes will be observed only in booms.
Porter (1983b) studies the railroad cartel which operated in the
1880s on the Chicago—New York route. He uses time series evidence (as
opposed to the cross section evidence of Bresnahan) to show that some
months were collusive while others were not. His theory which is
developed in Green and Porter (1984) is that the breakdowns from the
collusive output ought to occur in periods of unexpectedly low demand.
He finds no support for this theory from the residuals of his estimated
equations.Instead, we will argue his results support out theory. Table
2 presents the relevant facts. The first three columns are takenfrom
Porter'spaper. ThefirstTable 2



























































column shows an index of cartel nonadherence estimated by Porter. He
shows this index paralells quite closely the discussions intheRailway
Reviewand in the Chicago Tribune which are reported by IJien (1978). The
second column reports rail shipments of wheat from Chicago to New
York. The third column shows the percentage of wheat shipped by rail
from Chicago relative to the wheatshipped by bothlake and rail. The
last two columns are from the Chicago Board of Trade Annual Reports. The
fourth column presents the national production of grains estimated by the
Departmentof Agriculture. This total is constructed byadding the
productionsot' wheat, corn, rye, oats and barley in tons. This
aggregationis not too difficult to justify since the density of
different grains is fairly similar. Finally the last column represents
thenumber of days beetween April 1 and December 31 thatthe Straits of
Mackinacremained closed to navigation. (They were always closed
beetween January 1 andMarch31.) Such closures prevented lake shipments
of grain.
Ascan readily be seen from the table the three years in which the
most severe price wars occurred were 1881, 1884 and 1885. Those are also
the years in which rail shipments are the largest both in absolute terms
and relative to lake shipments. Thiscertainly does not suggest that
thesewars occurred in periods of depressed demand. However, shipments
may have been high only because the railroads were competing even though
demand was low. To analyze this possibility we report the values of two
natural determinants of demand.The first isthe length of timeduring
whichthe lakes were closed. The longer these lakes remained closed the
larger was the demand for rail transport. This is the only demand
variable included in Porter's study. The lakes were closed the longest28
in1881and 1885. These are also the years in which the index of cartel
nonadnerence ishighest.In1883and 1884 the lake, remained closed only
slight].y less time than in 1885 and yet there were price wars only in
1884. The second natural deterainant of demand, total grain production,
readily explains the anomalous behaviour of 1883. This was also the year
in which the total grain production was the second lowest in the entire
period and in particular, was 12% lower than in 1884. This must have
depressed demand so much that, in spite of the lake closings, total
demandfor railtransportwas low enough to warrant cooperation. A
numberofobjections canbe raisedagainstthis interpretation of
Porter'sfacts. First, Porter used weekly data instead of our annual
aggregates anditmight be thought that weekly data provide a stronger
basis for accepting or njeoting our theory. In fact, however, theprice
wars followed a seasonal time pattern. The first price war started
aroundJanuary 1881 and lastedfor the whole year. The second price war
startedaround January 1884 and ended at the end of 1885. Ye suspect
that around midwinter agents could form a fairly accurate prediction of
the opening of the lakes by studying the thickness of the ice. If they
expected the lakes to be closed for a long period they naturally expected
a price war to develop. Once the individual railroads predicted a war
for the future they were tempted to cut their prices loediatly for two
reasons.First, the penalties for deviating worereduced since in the
futurethe outcome will be competitive in anyevent.Second, individuals
who hadthecapacity tostore grain would postpone shipments if theyknew
a price war was imminentthus lowering even the monopoly price. The
presenceof such storage facilities would also seem tomake
identificationof the weekly changes in demand difficult. On the other29
hand years with high grain production or with a short lake shipping
seasonwill nonetheless be years of high demand.
Thesecond objectionto our analysisis thatweuse aggregate
productionin the entire United States as our proxy for grain production
in the Chicago region. The reason for this is that it is very difficult
to define the Chicago region. It clearly includes more than the state
of Illinois but less than our proxy. In any event the movements in total
production figures represent mostly movements in the production of the
grain belt which includes Illinois.
c)Price—cost margins
Onenatural test of our theoryis whether there is substantial price
cuttingby oligopolists when demand is high.Whatis difficult about
carrying out this test is that prices must be compared to marginalcosts
and thatdataon marginalcosts at the firm or even at the industry level
isnotoriously scarce. Traditionally researchers in Industrial
Organization have focused on price—cost margins which are given by sales
minus payroll and material costs divided by sales. This is a crude
approrimation to the Lerner Index which has the advantage of being easy
to compute. Indeed Scherer cites a number of studies which analyzed the
cyclical variability of these margins in different industries. These
studies have led to somewhat mixed conclusions. However Scherer
concludes on p.35?: "The weight of the available statistical evidence
suggests thatconcentratedindustries do exhibit somewhat different
pricing propensities over tine than their atomistic counterparts. They
reduceprices (and more importantly) price—cost margins byless in
responseto a demand slump and increase them by less in the boom phase".
This does not fit well with thefolklore which wouldpredict that on30
average prices would tend to fall more in recessions the more
concentrated is the industry. Our theory would explain these facts as
follows. It repiires that prices fall relative to marginal cost in
booms. This is consistent with rising price cost margins as long as some
ofthe expenditure on labor is in fact afixed cost. thiscan be seen as
follows: Suppose that price and marginalcostareconstantand that
thereare some fired costs. Then if the labor costs include some fired
costs an increase in output will lower the importance of these fixed
coststhus raising price—cost margins. The keyis thatprice—cost
marginsrise by less in concentrated industries. So either the fixed
costs are less important in the concentrated industries, which seems a
priori unlikely, or the concentrated industries tend to reduce prices
relativeto marginalcost.
We also study some independent evidence on margins. Thirds (1984)
reportscorrelations between employment and real product wages in various
two digitindustries. These real product wages are given by the average
hourly wage paid by the industry divided by the value added deflator for
the industry. They canbe interpreted asa different crudemeasureof
marginalcost over, prices. Their disadvantage over the traditional
price—costmargin is that, unlike the latter, they not only require that
materialsbe proportional to output but also that materials costs be
simply passed on as they would in a competitive industry with this cost
structure. On the other hand, their advantage over the traditional
measureis thatthey remain valid when some of the payroll expenditure is
afixed cost as long as, at the margin, labor has a constant marginal
product. Moreover it turns out that if the marginal product of labor31
actuallyfalls as employment rises our evidence provides even stronger
support for our theory.
The correlations reported by Burda for the realproduct wage and
employment using detrended yearly data from 1947 to 1978 are reported in
Table 3whichalso reports the average four firmconcentrationratio for
eachtwo digit industry. This average is obtained by weighting each four
digit SIC code industry within a particular 2 digit SIC code industry by
itssales in 1967. These weights were then applied to the 1967 four firia
concentration indices for each 4 digit SIC code industry obtained from
the Census.9
PASLE3
CONCEN'TRATION MTh THECORRELATION BEETYEEN REAL
•.tAGESMID E)LOfXENT
SIC# INDUSTRY DESIGNATION CORREL. CONCEN.
DURABLES MANUFACTURING
24 Lumberand wood products —.33 17.6
25 Furniture and fixtures —.18 21.6
32 Stone,clay and glass .39 37.4
33 Primarymetals .32 42.9
34 Fabricated metal industries .23 29.1
35 Machineryexcept electrical .12 36.3
36 Electrical and electronic equipment .34 45.0
371 Motor vehicles and equipment .19 80.5
372—9other transportation equipment .02 50.1
38 Instrumentsand related products —.36 47.8
NONDURABLE MMIUYACTURING
20 Food and Kindred products —.30 34.5
21 Tobaccomanufactures —.64 73.6
22 Textile mill products .04 34.1
23 Apparel and related products —.53 19.7
26 Paper and allied products —.42 71.2
27 Printing and publishing .40 18.9
28 Chemical and allied products —.03 49.9
29 Petroleum and coal products —.48 32.9
30 Rubber .16 69.1
31 Leather and leather products —.44 24.532
At first glance it is clear front the table that more concentrated
industries like motor vehicles and electrical machinery tend to have
positivecorrelations while lees concentratedindustries like leather,
foodand wood products tend to have negative correlations. Statistical
testing of this correlation with the concentration index is, however,
somewhat delicate. That is because our theory does not predict that an
industrywhich is 5%moreconcentrated than another will reduce prices
moreseverely in a boom. On the contrary a fully fledged monopoly will
always charge the monopoly price which usually increases when demand
increases, Allourtheory says is that as soon as an industry becomes an
oligopoly it becomes likely that it will cut prices in booms. Naturally
theconcentration index is not a perfect measure ofwhether an industry
isan oligopoly. Indeed printing has a 1.0w concentrationindexeven
though its large components are newspapers, books and magazines which are
in fact highly concentrated once location in space or type is taken into
account. Nonetheless higher concentration indices are at least
indicators of a sinner number ofimportant sellers. Glass is undoubtely
amore oligopo]istic industry than shoes. So we decided to classify the
sample into relatively unconcentrated and relatively concentrated and
chose, somewhat arbitrarily, as the dividing line the median -
concentrationof 35.4. This lies between food and nonelectrical




correlated 7 3 10
Positively
correlated 3 7 10
Total 10 ¶0 20
An alternative table can be obtained by neglecting the three
observationswhose correlations are effectively zero. These are sectors
22, 28 and372—9.Their correlations areat most equal in abeolute value
to a third of the next lowest correlation. Then the contingency table
has, instead of the values 7:3:3:7,thevalues 7:2:2:6.
Itis nownatural to test whether concentrated industries have the
same ratio of positive correlations to negative ones against the
alternative that this ratio is significantly higher. The x2testof
independenceactually only tests whether the values are unusual under the
hypothesis of independence without focusing on our particular
alternative. It rejects the hypothesis of independence with 92%
confidence using the values of Table 4 and with 97% confidence using the
values 7:2:2:6. This test is, however, likely to be flawed for the small
sample we consider. Fisher's test would appear more appropiate since it
i8 an exact test against the alternative that more concentrated sectors
have more positive correlations. With this test the hypothesis that the
ratio of positive correlations is the sane can be rejected with 91%34
confidence using the data of Table 4 and with 96% confidence using
7:2:2:6.
thereis thus afair amount of evidence for the hypothesis that more
concentratedsectors are more likely to have positive correlations. We
interpret this by imagining a world in which technology is subject to
technologicalprogress at a constant rate and in which capital is
accumulated smoothly. The deviations of employment from its trend then
occur only in response to increased demand. Then if the firms behave
monopolistically the real product wage will tend to fall when demand
increases. Thesamewill occur if the firms are competitive andthe
marginal product of labor falls as employment rises. Particularly when
there are diminishing returns to labor the finding that the product wage
rises when employment rises suggests the widespread price cutting our
theoryimplies.
There are alternative explanations for our findings, however. The
first is that the positive correlations are due to monopolistic pricing
in the face of increasing returns to labor in the short run. The
existence of such increasing retuns strike us as unlikely. When
production is curtailed this is usually done by temporary closings of
plants or reductions of hours worked. These reductions would always
start with the most inefficient plants and workers thus suggesting at
most constant returns to labor in the short run. The second alternative
explanation relies on technological shocks. These shocks can, in
principleeither increase or decrease the demand for labor by a
particularsector. If they increase the demand and the sector faces an
upwards sloping labor supply function, employment and real wages can both
increase. The difficulty with this alternative explanation is that the35
sectorswithpositive correlations do not appear to be those which a
casualobserver would characterize as having many technological shocks of
this type. In particular stone, clay and glass, printing and publishing
and rubber appear to be sectors with fair]j stagnant technologies. On the
other hand instruments and chemicals may well be among those whose
technolo- has been changing the fastest.36
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper basically consists of three parts. The first is a somewhat
novel theory of oligopolies in situations in which demand fluctuates.
The second is an analysis of the business cycles that such oligopolies
can induce, while the third isastudy of the plausibility of the idea
that oligopolistic industries tend to behave more competitively in booms.
Since the data appear consistent Withthisidea they conaitutefairly
direct evidence in favor of both our theory of oligopoly and that of
business cycles. This suggests that both theories and their empirical
validation deserve to be extended.
The theory of oligopolymight be extended toinclude also
imperfectlyobservable demand shifts, prices and outputs. This type of
imperfect observability is the main concern of Green and Porter (1984)
who study markets with no observable shifts in demand. The advantage of
introducing unobservable shifts in demand is that these can induce
reversions to punishing behavior even when all firms are acting
collusively.A natural question to ask is whether reversions to
punishing behavior that result from unobservable shocks are more likely
when everybody expects the demand curve to haveshiftedout.
Unfortunately this appears to be a verydifficultquestion to answer.
Even the features of the optimal supergame withoutobservable shocks
discussedin Porter (1983a) are hard to characterize. Adding the
complicationthat both the length of the punishment period as well as the
price that triggers a reversion depend on observable demand is a37
formidabletask.
In this paper we considered only business cycles which are due
to the tendency of oligopolists to act more competitively when
demandshifts towardstheir products. Analternativeand commonly held
viewis that business cycles are due to changes in aggregate demand which
do not get reflected innominalwages. In that case a decrease in
aggregate demand raises real wages thereby reducing all outputs. In our
theoryof oligopoly, firmstend to collude more in these periods. Hence
recessionsare not only badbecauseoutput is low but also because
mioroeconomicdistortions are greater.This suggests that stabilization
ofoutput at a high level is desirable because it reduces these
distortions.
On the other hand, the busine8s cycles discussed here do not
necessarily warrant stabilization policy. While models of real
business cycles merely feature ineffective stabilization policies
herssuchpolicies might actually be harmfull. Booms occur because,
occasionally, demand shifts towards oligopolistic products. In these
periods the incentive to deviate from the collusive outcome is greatest
because the punishment will be felt in periods which, on average have
lower demand and hence lower profits. If instead future demand were also
known to be high, the threat of losing the monopoly profits in those good
periods might well be enough to induce the members of the oligopoly to
colludenow. So, if demandfor the goods produced by oligopolies were
stablethey might collude always, leaving the economy in a permanent
recession.10 Therefore the merits of stabilization policy hinge
crucially on whether business cycles are due to shifts in demand38
unaccompanied by nominal rigidities or whether they are due to changeB in
aggregate demand accompanied by such rigidities. Disentangling the
nature of the shifts in the demand faced by oligolopies therefore seellia
tQ be a promising line of research.
Much work also remains to be done empirically validating our
model itself. In section ivwepresented a variety of simple tests
capable of discriminating between the Industrial Organization folklore
and our theory. Since none of them favored the folklore it may well be
without empirical content. On the other hand, our theory desenee to be
tested more severely. First a more disagregated study of the cyclical
properties of price—cost margins seems warranted. Unfortunately, data on
valued added deflators does not appear to exist at a more disagregated
level so a different methodology will have to be employed. Second our
theory has strong implications for the behaviour of structural models of
specific industries. Th. study of such models ought to shed light on the
extent to which observable shifts in demand affect the degree of
collusion.39
FOOTNOTES
11f firms findborrowing difficult, recessions might be the ideal
occasions for large established firms to elbow out their smaller
competitors.
2See, for example, Friedman (1971), Green and Porter (1984) and Radner
(1980).
3sequentially rational strategies are analysed in gaines of incomplete
information by Kreps andWilson(1952). For the gameofcomplete
informationthat we analyse we use Selten'sconcept of subgame perfection
(1965).
kIn an informal discussion,Kurz(1979) recognizes the link between
short—run profitability and the sustainability of collusive outcomes.
However, the relationship between profits, demand, and costs isnot make
explicit.
5Theargument of K, 4,in(3)should not be confused with that in (I).
The latter represents the realization of the shock at t whereas the
former is the state beyond which monopoly becomes unsustainable.
61n this case an increase in can directly be interpreted as either a
shift outwards in demand or a reduction in c, that part of marginal cost
which is independent of q. This results from the fact that the profit
functions depend on s only through (a+ st—c).
7Therelevant root is the one with the highest profits for the
oligopoly;
8The interoectoral pattern of output movements can be independent of the
sectorwhich has a technological shock if(asseems unlikely) goods are
consumed in fixed proportions which depend on the level of utility only.
Otherwise "normal" substitution effects will make the expansion biggest
in the sector which has the most favorable technological shock.
en constructing these aggregate concentration indices we
systematically neglected the 4 digit SIC code industries which ended
in 99.Thesecontain miscellaneous or "not classified elsewhere" items
whoseconcentration index does not measure market power in a relatiely
homogeneous market.
10For the examples in Figures 2 and3this occurs as long as 5>0.8 when
prize is the strategic variable or 8>0.25 when quantities are the
strategic variable.4$)
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